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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

INT 426/1

(1) S/S

(2) S/S

291

February 25, 1948

MEMORANDUM

To: S/S - Mr. Humelsine

I am returning Mr. Forrestal's memorandum which you gave me on February 20, and I do not believe that an answer is required. In order that the Secretary may be prepared to discuss the matter if Mr. Forrestal should raise the subject in the near future--as indicated in the last paragraph of his memorandum--I am forwarding herewith a memorandum for the Secretary embodying our views on Mr. Forrestal's suggestions.

I discussed this subject generally with the Secretary on February 12, after clearing it with Mr. Lovett, and provided him with a memorandum dated February 11, a copy of which is also attached.

It is, of course, possible that Mr. Forrestal will not bring this matter up. I believe the Armed Services are making a concerted effort to persuade him that his procedural suggestions are not the proper solution to the problem.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Forrestal, James

Attn.

SA-As/PA:ejg

EXEMPT

Classified/Extended by DIRNSA/CHCSS

Reason: NSC Classification Guidelines 7a-7 F.2

Re-Review Date 9/1/81

EXEMPT from automatic declassification
per E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(a)(2)

NSA 4 Jan 76

Agency Date 1983

Reason: NSC Classification Guidelines 7a-7 F.2

Re-Review Date 9/1/81

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

INT 426A/H

7

February 25, 1948

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary

Subject: Mr. Forrestal's Memorandum re the Proposed New Charter for the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

Discussion:

Mr. Forrestal's position--that the National Security Council is the proper appellate body for the resolution of matters which might not be solved at the USCIB level--is identical with the position of the Department's representatives throughout the negotiations, and those representatives agree with Mr. Forrestal on this point even though they accepted a compromise to avoid a complete deadlock.

The Department's representatives also agree with Mr. Forrestal that an Executive Order is not necessary to attain the current objective of stabilizing the status of USCIB, although they feel that an executive order would be desirable in order to maintain authoritative control over communications intelligence security.

Mr. Forrestal's procedural suggestions indicate (a) that the matter has been viewed as one involving the problem of operational control of the communications intelligence effort; and (b) that the valid solution to such a problem requires specific exercise of CIA authority through issuance of a CIA directive. The Department's representatives cannot concur with that portion of Mr. Forrestal's memorandum for the following reasons:

(1) Mr. Forrestal's suggestions, if adopted, would introduce machinery for the solution of a non-existent problem. USCIB is in fact an operating interdepartmental agency solely concerned with the management and coordination of communications intelligence security and production, both technologically and substantively.

EXEMPT from automatic declassification
per EO 11652, Sec. 3(E)(2)

Classified by NCB Date 1/18/92
Agency NSA
Reason: NSA
Re-Review on 9/11/92
Date 9/11/92
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C76-179

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Reason: NSA Declassification Guidelines
Re-Review on 9/11/92
Date 9/11/92

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

INT 4268/10
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The problem at hand is to regularize the membership of USCIB--whose original charter does not recognize the added members--and to restate the authority of the Board so as to conform with the National Security Act.

(2) Mr. Forrestal's suggestions omit consideration of the fact that the production and evaluation of communications intelligence are almost exclusively tactical by nature and seldom, if ever, are strategic. Consequently, the technological management which is indispensable to the conduct of communications intelligence activities is a responsibility to be borne primarily by the producing agencies. Mr. Forrestal's suggestions, if adopted as now stated, would result in an apparent unification of tactical military and naval activities under the direction of a non-military group which was created primarily for the handling of strategic intelligence.

In lieu of Mr. Forrestal's procedural suggestions, it is the view of the Department's representatives that the objectives sought through the proposed charter can best be attained by having the National Security Council issue to the member departments and agencies of USCIB an Intelligence Directive which would incorporate substantially the agreed-upon provisions of the charter, but would substitute the National Security Council as the appellate body in place of the body presently named in the charter.

The Department's representatives also feel that the regularizing of USCIB is not an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee, whose primary responsibility, it is understood, is to examine the operations of CIA. On the other hand, it would seem most appropriate for that Committee to conduct its examination of CIA communications intelligence activities in relation to the existing inter-departmental effort in that field.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that

(1) You urge Mr. Forrestal to accept the procedure of having the National Security Council issue to the member departments and agencies of USCIB an Intelligence Directive which would incorporate substantially the agreed-upon provisions of the charter, but would substitute the National Security Council as the appellate body in place of the body presently named in the charter.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

INT 4262/3
5

(2) In the event that Mr. Forrestal is unable to accept this solution, you reject his procedural suggestions and reaffirm the compromise already accepted by the Department's representatives and discussed with you on February 12, 1948.

W. Park Armstrong Jr.
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

SA-A:WPA:ejg

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INT 4263/1
6

EXEMPT
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Reason: NSA Declassification Guidelines
204 9/15/81
February 11, 1968

EXEMPT from automatic declassification
per E.O. 11652, Sec. 5. EX-11
Name [redacted] Agency [redacted]
A 1983
Reason [redacted] Previously AG-REF 20

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary

Subject: Proposed New Charter for the UNITED STATES COMMUNICATION
INTELLIGENCE BOARD (USCIB).

Discussion:

The U.S. Communication Intelligence Board was founded in March 1945 as the Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board (ANCIB) by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Subsequently the Department of State joined the Board (and is represented thereon by SA-A) and later the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the name changed to the present one. The original charter does not recognize the added members, and, in view of the responsibilities in the communication intelligence field which they have assumed, the Board has felt that its membership should be regularized and its authorities restated to conform with the National Security Act of 1947. The Board has for several months been considering the provisions of a new charter which would (a) establish it within the executive branch as the appropriate body responsible for certain functional powers, such as security of communication intelligence and the conduct of liaison in this field, (b) confirm the present membership of the Board and consolidate its accomplishments in the field of interdepartmental collaboration, and (c) establish an appellate body to resolve questions upon which the Board reaches an impasse.

The Department's representatives in the negotiations took the position that the Board should report on stalemated questions to the National Security Council for resolution; they were supported in this by CIA (the FBI having retired from the Board in September 1947). The Armed Services took the position that the Board should report such cases to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A complete deadlock in this issue could only be avoided by a compromise under which the Board will refer disputed questions to a body consisting of the Under Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services.

Recommendation:

That you approve the new charter for USCIB (attached as Tab A) and the proposed Executive Order to be issued by the President (attached as Tab B), that you approve a memorandum for the President

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INT 4263/2
P6

(copy attached as Tab C) and sign the original when it has been signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Armed Services.

Attachments:

Tab A
Tab B
Tab C

Exhibit I (Chronological outline of the history of USCIB)

Exhibit II (Charter of ANCIB dated March 10, 1945)

Exhibit III (Memorandum from the President dated September 12, 1945)

Exhibit IV (Memorandum from Secretary Byrnes designating the Special Assistant as Departmental representative in communication intelligence, dated October 23, 1945)

Exhibit V (Department of State membership in the Board dated December 20, 1945)

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

13 February 1958

Classified/Extended by DIRM/CHCSS
Reason: NSA Declassification Guideline
Re-review on 2011-07-14/58
Date

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

EX-101 - Declassification
Ver. 2.2, 11/1/80, Sec. 3.2 E2
Name: [redacted] Agency: [redacted] Date: 1983
Reason: [redacted] Declassify on: 12-RE/10
C70-1-5

I have just completed a study of the papers dealing with the proposed establishment of the United States Communication Intelligence Board. Substantively, I am in complete agreement with the objects which these papers seek to accomplish.

Procedurally, however, it seems to me that there is no need for an Executive Order, in view of the very clear provisions of the National Security Act. I realize, of course, that the predecessor board was established by Executive Order, but that event took place prior to the passage of the National Security Act.

In view of the subsequent passage of that Act - and especially in view of the language of section 102 of the Act, which deals with the Central Intelligence Agency - I feel that the objects desired can more appropriately be accomplished by means of a Central Intelligence Agency directive.

I think that this procedure will work out satisfactorily from the standpoint of all concerned, since the Central Intelligence Agency is, by section 102, "established under the National Security Council", and since all of the Departments which are to be members of the United States Communication Intelligence Board are already members of the National Security Council.

It is my belief, therefore, that the substantive results envisioned by the subject papers can best be accomplished in the procedural manner I have indicated. If this is done, the National Security Council will itself constitute a group which can resolve any matters which are not decided at a lower level.

I expect to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State in the near future, and would appreciate any comments you may have in the meantime. I also suggest that this would be an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee which is to examine the operations of CIA.

Forrestal

cc: Secretary of State ← James Forrestal
Director, C.I.A.

2-359

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